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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the pricing performance of agricultural market 
advisory services in hogs.  Pricing recommendations are available for all quarters from 
the beginning of 1995 through the end of 2001.  The results show that average differences 
between advisory programs and market benchmarks are small in nominal terms for all 
three benchmarks, -$0.41/cwt., $0.00/cwt. and -$0.27/cwt. versus the cash, index and 
empirical benchmarks, respectively, and none of the average differences are significantly 
different from zero.  Hence, advisory programs as a group do not outperform the market 
benchmarks in terms of average price.  Advisory programs also do not outperform the 
market benchmarks in terms of average price and risk.  Finally, there is little evidence 
that advisory programs with superior performance can be usefully selected based on past 
performance in the hog market.  
 
 The Performance of Agricultural Market Advisory Services in Hogs 
 
  Management of price volatility is an important aspect of business for hog 
producers.  Hog price variability is often the highest rated source of income variability 
identified by producers (e.g., Patrick, et al.).  While vertical integration and contracting 
have increased rapidly in recent years, at least partially in response to price risk, over 
70% of producers still use cash market sales to some extent (Patrick, et al.).  
Consequently, price risk management is still a major concern for producers.  One 
approach to managing this risk is the use of market advisory services.  For a subscription 
fee, these services give specific recommendations to producers on how and when to price 
their production. 
  
Despite the popularity of market advisory services among livestock producers 
(e.g., Schroeder, et al.), there is no evidence regarding the performance of these services 
in livestock markets.  Previous studies of market advisory service performance have been 
limited to grain markets (Gehrt and Good; Martines-Filho; Jirik et al.; Irwin, Martines-
Filho and Good).  The evidence in these studies suggests a limited ability to outperform 
the market in corn and soybeans and no ability in wheat.  It is not known whether the 
results generalize to livestock commodities.  Livestock marketing is quite different from 
grain marketing, due to the non-storable nature of livestock and relatively constant 
production through time.  It is therefore reasonable to argue that different marketing 
strategies may be optimal in livestock markets, as compared to grains.  Hence, market 
advisory service performance may be different in livestock markets. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the pricing performance of agricultural 
market advisory services for hogs.  Following Irwin, Martines-Filho and Good two key 
performance questions will be addressed: 1) Do market advisory services, on average, 
outperform an appropriate hog market benchmark? and 2) Do market advisory services 
exhibit persistence in their performance in the hog market over time?  The data for the 
study is provided by the Agricultural Market Advisory Service (AgMAS) Project.  
Pricing recommendations are available for all quarters from the beginning of 1995 
through the end of 2001.  This 28 quarter sample should be large enough to provide a 
reasonably reliable estimate of true market advisory service performance in the hog 
market.  Also, the sample period is characterized by large variation in hog prices, ranging 
from the relatively high prices of 1996 to the drastic price drop of late 1998.  Since the 
AgMAS Project subscribes to all of the services and collects "real-time" 
recommendations, the data is not subject to survivorship bias.  Finally, while the sample 
of advisory services is non-random, it is constructed to be generally representative of the 
majority of advisory services offered to hog producers. 
  
The procedure used to compute net hog prices for each advisory program is 
similar to the procedure used in earlier AgMAS Reports (e.g., Irwin, Martines-Filho and 
Good).  In particular, after the stream of recommendations is collected for hogs in a 
particular quarter, the net price that would have been received by a hog producer who 
precisely follows the set of pricing recommendations is computed.  Since cash hog 
pricing recommendations are often limited and quite short-run in nature, the same cash marketing strategy will be assumed for all services.  Therefore, the net advisory price will 
be computed as the quarterly average cash sale price plus or minus gains/losses and 
brokerage costs associated with futures and options transactions.  The first performance 
test compares the average price of advisory programs and benchmarks.  The second 
compares both the average price and risk of advisory programs and benchmarks.  The 
third evaluates the predictability of advisory program performance from period-to-period.  
Three market benchmarks are developed for the evaluations.  
 
Market Advisory Service Recommendations 
 
  The AgMAS Project was initiated in 1994 with the goal of providing unbiased 
and rigorous evaluation of market advisory services.  Five criteria have been used to 
determine which advisory services are included in the AgMAS study.  First, marketing 
recommendations from an advisory service must be received electronically in real time.  
Second, a service has to provide marketing recommendations to hog producers rather 
than (or in addition to) speculators or “traders.”  Third, marketing recommendations from 
an advisory service must be in a form suitable for application to a representative hog 
producer.  That is, the recommendations have to specify the percentage of hog production 
involved in each transaction ---futures or options--- and the price or date at which each 
transaction is to be implemented.  Fourth, advisory services must provide “blanket” or 
“one-size fits all” marketing recommendations so there is no uncertainty about 
implementation.  Fifth, a candidate service must be a viable, commercial business.   
  
The original sample of market advisory services was drawn from the list of 
Premium Services available from the two major agricultural satellite networks, Data 
Transmission Network (DTN) and FarmDayta, in the summer of 1994.
1  While the list of 
advisory services available from these networks was by no means exhaustive, it did have 
the considerable merit of meeting a market test.  Presumably, the services offered by the 
networks were those most in demand by farm subscribers to the networks.  In addition, 
the list of available services was cross-checked with other farm publications to confirm 
that widely followed advisory firms were included in the sample.  It seems reasonable to 
argue that the resulting sample of services was generally representative of the majority of 
advisory services available to farmers. 
 
Additions and deletions to the sample of advisory services have occurred over 
time.  Additions largely have been due to the increasing availability of market advisory 
services via alternative means of electronic delivery, in particular, websites and e-mail.  
Deletions have occurred for a variety of reasons.  A total of 15 advisory service programs 
for hogs have been included in the sample at some point in time.
2  Table 1 contains the 
complete list of advisory programs and includes a brief explanation why each program 
not included for all marketing quarters is added or deleted from the sample.  The term 
“advisory program” is used because one advisory service has more than one distinct 
marketing program for hogs (AgriVisor). 
 
Three forms of survivorship bias may be potential problems when assembling an 
advisory program database.  Survival bias significantly biases measures of performance 
  2upwards since "survivors" typically have higher performance than "non-survivors" (e.g., 
Brown et al.; Schneeweis, McCarthy and Spurgin; Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson).  
The first and most direct form of survivorship bias occurs if only advisory programs that 
remain in business at the end of a given sample period are included in the sample.  This 
form of bias should not be present in the AgMAS database of advisory programs because 
all programs that have been tracked over the entire time period of the study are included 
in the sample.  The second form of survivorship bias occurs if discontinued advisory 
programs are deleted from the sample for the quarter when they are discontinued.  This is 
a form of survivorship bias because only survivors for the full marketing quarter are 
tracked.  The AgMAS database of advisory programs should not be subject to this form 
of bias because programs discontinued during a marketing quarter remain in the sample 
for that marketing quarter.  The third and most subtle form of survivorship bias occurs if 
data from prior periods are "back-filled" at the point in time when an advisory program is 
added to the database.  This is a form of survivorship bias because data from surviving 
advisory programs are back-filled.  The AgMAS database should not be subject to this 
form of bias because recommendations are not back-filled when an advisory program is 
added.  Instead, recommendations are collected only for the marketing quarter a decision 
has been made to add an advisory program to the database. 
  
The AgMAS Project subscribes to all of the services that are followed and records 
recommendations on a real-time basis, and therefore, the database of recommendations 
should not be subject to hindsight bias.  The information is received electronically, via 
satellite, website or e-mail.  For the programs that provide multiple daily updates, 
information is recorded for all updates.  In this way, the actions of a producer-subscriber 
are simulated in real-time.  The final set of recommendations attributed to each advisory 
program represents the best efforts of the AgMAS Project staff to accurately and fairly 
interpret the information made available by each advisory program.  In cases where a 
recommendation is considered vague or unclear, some judgment is exercised as to 
whether or not to include that particular recommendation.  Given that some 
recommendations are subject to interpretation, the possibility is acknowledged that the 
AgMAS track record of recommendations for a given program may differ from that 
stated by the advisory program, or from that recorded by another subscriber. 
 
Marketing Behavior of Advisory Services 
 
Before examining pricing performance, it is useful to understand the marketing 
behavior of advisory services.  Previous research has shown that advisory programs 
employ a diverse set of futures, options and cash positions in the corn and soybean 
markets (Bertoli et al.).  The marketing behavior of advisory programs in hogs is 
described in two steps.  First, the frequency that advisory programs use various marketing 
tools is described.  Second, the magnitude of marketing tool usage is presented. 
 
Table 2 shows frequency counts of marketing tool use for individual programs 
across quarters.  Note that advisory programs with one year or less of data are excluded 
to minimize the impact of programs that have only a few positions.  The results show that 
the most frequently used marketing tool is a futures only position, with every program 
  3employing futures in at least one quarter.  On average, futures only positions are used in 
55.9% of the marketing quarters.  The most frequent use of futures only positions is 
87.5% of marketing quarters and the least frequent is 7.1%.  The vast majority of futures 
positions are short hedges, as long futures positions are only taken five times throughout 
the entire study period.  Options only positions are used much less frequently than futures 
only positions.  Five programs never use options only positions and the average use of 
options only positions is 6.9% of the marketing quarters.  The most frequent use of 
options only positions is 35.7%.  A combination of futures and options is more popular 
then options only positions, averaging 23.8% of marketing quarters.
3  Only two programs 
never used a combination of futures and options positions.  Several programs frequently 
used both futures and options during a marketing window.  For example, one program 
used this marketing tool 70% of the time.  The most common type of combination 
strategy consists of long puts and short calls placed at the same to create a fence strategy.  
No futures or options positions are observed relatively infrequently. 
 
The various positions that an advisory program can take at a point in time must be 
weighted in some manner before valid comparisons of the magnitude of marketing tool 
usage can be made.  Since the price exposure of a portfolio of positions is a weighted-
average of the price exposures of the individual positions, where the weights are the 
deltas of the individual positions (Hull), “marketing profiles” can be constructed that are 
comparable across time and programs.
4  More specifically, a marketing profile shows the 
net amount priced (sold) by an advisory program, on a cumulative basis, each day over 
the marketing window.  Two marketing profile examples are presented in Figure 1.
5  
These profiles nicely illustrate the range in marketing behavior found in the data.  The top 
panel shows a “conservative” approach, where a program engages in a small number of 
incremental pricing transactions before the marketing quarter (1999:III).  The bottom 
panel shows an “aggressive” approach, which includes a long period of no pricing, two 
periods where net pricing swings between net short and net long (negative net amount 
priced) and a relatively large net long position is accumulated going into the marketing 
quarter (1999:I). 
 
Profiles for each advisory program are combined across all marketing quarters to 
examine the magnitude of pricing at specific points in time.
6  Table 3 presents the 
average, minimum and maximum net amount priced for each advisory program 9-
months, 6-months, 3-months and the day prior to the beginning of the marketing quarter 
(0-months).  In addition, averages across all programs on these dates are also presented.  
Results indicate that the amount priced generally is low nine months prior to the 
marketing quarter, averaging only three percent.  The lowest average amount priced is 
zero percent and the highest is 6.6%.  The range for individual programs 9-months prior 
to the marketing quarter, between zero and 75% priced is nonetheless quite large.  The 
average net amount priced across all programs increases modestly to 7.6% by 6-months 
prior to the marketing quarter.  The range 6-months prior to the marketing quarter is 
again large, with a minimum net amount priced of zero percent and a maximum of 100%.  
The average net amount priced more than doubles to 15.0% by 3-months before the 
marketing quarter.  The lowest average amount priced 3-months prior to the marketing 
quarter is 4.4% and the largest is 27%.  A further increase in the average net amount 
  4priced is observed when moving to the day prior to the marketing quarter (0-months), 
where the average equals 21.7%.  Not surprisingly, the range on the day prior to the 
marketing quarter is the highest, with a minimum net amount priced of -100% and a 
maximum of 110%.  It is interesting to note that the largest average net amount priced at 
this point in time is a relatively modest 31.6%.  Please note that the complete average 
marketing profile across all programs, broken out by quarter, is presented in Figure 2.        
 
The marketing profile examples suggest several interesting observations.  First, 
the average amount of pricing previous to a marketing quarter is relatively modest.  
Across all programs, the average cumulative amount priced at the start of a marketing 
quarter is 21.7%, which can be compared to 39% and 33%, respectively, priced on 
average by advisory programs at the start of corn and soybean harvest (Irwin, Martines-
Filho and Good).  Second, even though average pricing is relatively modest, there is large 
variation in the amount priced within marketing quarters, across marketing quarters and 
across advisory programs.  This suggests advisory programs in hogs frequently engage in 
what Working termed “selective” hedging strategies.
7  Analogous variation in the net 
amount priced is found in corn and soybeans within crop years, across crop years and 
across programs (Irwin, Martines-Filho and Good).  Third, the variation in the net amount 
priced (hedge ratio) is larger than that generated by optimal hedging models in most 
applications to commodity markets (e.g., Lei, Liu and Hallam; Martines-Filho).
8 
 
Computing the Returns to Marketing Recommendations 
 
  In order to simulate a consistent and comparable set of results across different 
market advisory programs, certain explicit marketing assumptions are made.  These 
assumptions are intended to accurately depict “real-world” marketing conditions.  Several 
key assumptions are: i) the unit of analysis is a calendar quarter, ii) the representative hog 
producer uses the Iowa/Minnesota cash hog market, iii) no cash sales advise, if given by 
a program, is followed due to the limited and short-run nature of cash hog pricing 
recommendations (typically, a horizon of no more than a few days), iv) hog producers are 
assumed to be on a constant production schedule, so the net cash sales price equals the 
average cash market price (Iowa/Minnesota cash price), v) with a few exceptions, the 
marketing window for a quarter is one year in length and includes the three quarters 
previous to the marketing quarter and the marketing quarter itself, vi) spot cash prices are 
converted from carcass prices in order to create a consistent cash price across the entire 
sample
9 and vii) brokerage costs are charged for all futures and options transactions.  
Based on these and other assumptions, a weighted-average net price is computed for each 
advisory program included in a particular marketing quarter.   
 
  An example will help illustrate the computation of net advisory prices.  For the 
fourth quarter of 1998, the highest net advisory price is $28.24/cwt., and it is computed as 
the net cash sales price ($20.34) plus futures and options gain ($8.51) minus brokerage 
costs ($0.61).  Note that under the assumptions outlined above the net cash sales price is 
the same for all advisory programs.  Webber provides complete details on assumptions 
and computation of net advisory prices. 
 
  5Three market benchmarks are used to compute the returns to the marketing advice 
provided by advisory programs.  Multiple benchmarks are developed to test the 
sensitivity of performance results to different benchmark specifications.  Market 
benchmarks are based on the theory of efficient markets.
10  In its strongest form, efficient 
market theory predicts that market prices always fully reflect available public and private 
information (Fama).  The practical implication is that no trading strategy can consistently 
beat the return offered by the market.  Hence, the return offered by the market becomes 
the relevant benchmark.  In the context of this study, a market benchmark should measure 
the average price offered by the market over the marketing window of a representative 
farmer who follows advisory program recommendations.  The average price is computed 
in order to reflect the returns to a naïve, “no-information” strategy of marketing equal 
amounts each day during the marketing window.  The difference between advisory prices 
and the market benchmark measures the value of advisory service information.  The 
theory of efficient markets predicts this difference, on average, will equal zero.
11 
 
The first market benchmark assumes the relevant marketing window is the three 
months of the marketing quarter.  The “cash” benchmark is therefore simply the average 
cash price over the marketing quarter, reflecting the assumption of equal sales each 
business day of the marketing quarter.  Cash benchmark prices turn out to be same as the 
net cash sales price (Iowa/Minnesota) assumed for the computation of net advisory 
prices. 
 
  The second market benchmark assumes the relevant marketing window is the same 
as that assumed for advisory programs: the one year period that includes the three 
quarters previous to the marketing quarter and the marketing quarter itself.  In this case, 
the underlying marketing strategy is to sell an equal amount of hog production each day 
of the one-year marketing window.  Previous to the start of the marketing quarter, this 
can be accomplished by assuming a producer sells an equal amount of hog production 
using futures contracts.  Since the marketing window begins 9-months prior to the 
marketing quarter, futures are assumed to be sold daily to build up a 75% hedge position 
just prior to the start of the marketing quarter.  Then, cash sales are made daily during the 
marketing quarter and hedge positions lifted.  It is assumed that the hedged positions are 
lifted once a month on the Wednesday closest to the 15
th of each month of the marketing 
quarter.  This market benchmark is labeled the “index” benchmark, since it reflects an 
average price offered by the market over the entire one-year marketing window. 
 
  The third market benchmark also assumes the relevant marketing window is the 
one year period that includes the three quarters previous to the marketing quarter and the 
marketing quarter itself.  This benchmark is motivated by the evidence from average 
marketing profiles (Figure 2) that the average amount hedged by advisory programs tends 
to be substantially lower than 75% prior to entry into the marketing quarter.  An 
“empirical” market benchmark is specified based on the average marketing profiles.  
Instead of building up to a 75% hedged position, the average marketing profiles suggest a 
lower net amount sold prior to the start of the marketing quarter.  Pricing percentages 
used for the first through the fourth quarters are 19.3%, 24.2%, 20.4% and 20.1%, 
  6respectively.  Otherwise, the computations follow those discussed above for the index 
market benchmark. 
 
Net Advisory Prices and Benchmarks 
 
Summary statistics for net advisory prices and corresponding market benchmarks 
for the first quarter of 1995 through the fourth quarter of 2001 are presented in Tables 4 
and 5.  Table 4 shows that net advisory prices vary substantially across quarters.  The 
highest average net advisory price, $56.15/cwt., occurred in the second quarter of 1997, 
while the lowest average net advisory price, $24.13/cwt., occurred in the fourth quarter of 
1998.  The highest net advisory price for an individual program over the sample period is 
$59.02/cwt., also obtained in the second quarter of 1997.  The lowest net advisory price 
for an individual program is $19.51/cwt., obtained in the fourth quarter of 1998.  It is not 
surprising that high and low net advisory prices occurred during the same quarters as the 
high and low for the cash market benchmark, since the only difference between net 
advisory prices and the cash market benchmark is net futures and options trading 
profits/losses.  The average net advisory price across all quarters is $42.82/cwt., close to 
the average market benchmark prices over the same period.  There are only modest 
differences in average market benchmark prices; however, there can be substantial 
differences for individual marketing quarters.  The statistics in Table 4 also reveal 
substantial variation in performance across advisory programs within marketing quarters.  
The range in net advisory prices averages $5.97/cwt. across all 28 quarters and exceeds 
$10/cwt. in one quarter (1999:I). 
 
  The proportion of advisory programs above each of the three market benchmarks 
for the first quarter of 1995 through the fourth quarter of 2001 is presented in Table 5.  
The results reveal substantial variation in the proportion of net advisory prices above the 
three market benchmarks for individual marketing quarters.  For example, in the fourth 
quarter of 1998, when hogs prices bottomed, 92% of the programs beat the cash 
benchmark, no programs beat the index benchmark and 67% beat the empirical 
benchmark.  This outcome is feasible given the different amounts of pricing (hedging) 
incorporated in the index and empirical benchmarks.  When prices fall, the index and 
empirical benchmarks are above the cash benchmark because the short hedges 
incorporated in the index and empirical benchmarks generate profits, thereby increasing 
net price.  For the fourth quarter of 1998, eight of twelve programs have hedge profits 
greater than the 20.1% hedge position incorporated in the empirical benchmark.  No 
program has profits greater than the 75% hedge position that is incorporated in the index 
benchmark.  Eleven of the twelve advisory programs have hedging profits greater than 
zero, so their net prices are above the cash benchmark.    
 
Table 5 also displays average proportions across all programs from the first 
quarter of 1995 through the fourth quarter of 2001.
 12  By analogy to the flips of a fair 
coin, these average proportions must be greater than 50% in order to “beat the market.”  
The average proportion versus the cash market benchmark is 41%, indicating a lower 
than average chance that advisory programs will exceed cash benchmark prices.  The 
average proportion versus the index market benchmark is 56%, indicating a slightly 
  7higher than average chance that programs will exceed index benchmark prices.  The 
average proportion versus the empirical market benchmark is 46%, again indicating a 
lower than average chance that advisory programs will exceed given benchmark prices.  
Overall, these results suggest the chance of advisory programs “beating the market” in 
hogs is not high.  It is interesting to compare the proportions to those reported in other 
studies on the performance of market advisory programs and professional investment 
managers.  The proportions for hogs tend to be lower than those reported for market 
advisory programs in corn and soybeans (Irwin, Martines-Filho and Good), but higher 
than those found for wheat (Jirik et al.)  Malkiel reports that the proportion of active 
mutual fund managers beating the stock market is only 33%, much lower than what is 
found in hogs. 
 
Average Price Performance 
 
The performance indicator examined in this section is the average price of 
advisory programs relative to the average price associated with market benchmarks.
13, 
14 
Given that risk is not considered, this indicator is strictly applicable only to decision-
makers with risk-neutral preferences.  While this may seem unrealistic from a theoretical 
perspective, there is evidence that many producers focus mainly on expected returns, a 
point emphasized recently by Tomek and Peterson.   
 
A number of different statistical tests can be used to determine the significance of 
observed differences in sample means.  In the present context, it is critical to recognize 
that there is a “natural” pairing in the sample data that can be used to increase the power 
of statistical tests (Snedecor and Cochran, pp. 101).  More specifically, net advisory 
prices and benchmark prices for the same marketing quarter are paired, in the sense that 
the same marketing quarter receives different “treatments” from advisory programs and 
benchmarks.  The treatments correspond to the differing marketing strategies used by 
advisory programs and benchmarks.   
 
Given that the sample data are paired, the appropriate test of the null hypothesis 
of zero difference between the mean of net advisory and benchmark prices is the paired t-
test.  First, define the following difference for a given benchmark, 
 
(1)  ( ) 1,..., ; 1,..., it it t r NAP BP i N t T =− = =  
 
where   is the net price for the i
th advisory program in the t
th marketing quarter and  it NAP
t BP is the benchmark price in the t
th marketing quarter.  The underlying statistical model 
is, 
 
(2)  it it re µ = +    
 
where µ  is the expected value (mean) of the difference between the net price for the i
th 
advisory program and the benchmark price and   is the error term for the i
th advisory 
program in the t
th marketing quarter.  Note that the model assumes the expected value of 
it e
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programs and marketing quarters.  Three key assumptions typically are made about the 
error term.  The first, eN
2 ~( 0 , it i ) σ , implies that errors are normally distributed with an 
expected value of zero and variance equal to 
2
i σ .  The second assumption, 
, implies that errors for the same advisory program are independent 
through time.  The third assumption, 
cov( , ) 0 , it is ee t s =∀
cov( , 0 , it ij ) jt ee = ∀ , implies that errors for the 
same marketing quarter are independent across advisory programs.  Given these 
assumptions, it is straightforward to test the null hypothesis of no difference in mean 
price for all programs and marketing quarters pooled together, as a conventional t-
statistic can be computed and used to infer the significance of observed mean differences. 
  
Before conducting the statistical tests, it is important to investigate if the key 
assumptions discussed above hold for the available sample of net advisory prices.  The 
first assumption, normality, is tested via the Jarque-Bera test (Bera and Jarque, 1981, 
1982).  In order to maximize the number of time-series observations available for each 
program, the sample for this analysis is limited to the nine programs active in all 28 
marketing quarters.  Test statistics indicate normality is rejected for three advisory 
programs for differences versus the cash benchmark and none for differences versus the 
index or empirical benchmarks.
15  Since normality is rejected in relatively few instances, 
non-normality does not appear to be a serious problem.  Furthermore, the t-test generally 
is a conservative (in the sense of controlling the probability of Type I error) and reliable 
approximation in the cases where normality may not be appropriate (Greene, p. 106).  
The second assumption implies that advisory program differences versus the benchmarks 
are independent across marketing quarters.  The following section on predictability of 
performance indicates limited evidence of dependence through time.  So, this does not 
appear to be a serious statistical problem either. 
   
The third assumption implies that advisory program differences versus the 
benchmarks are independent across programs for a given marketing quarter.  Correlations 
across advisory programs provide evidence on the seriousness of this problem.  Again, in 
order to maximize the number of time-series observations available for each program, the 
sample is limited to the nine programs active in all 28 marketing quarters.  Correlation 
coefficients are first estimated for net advisory prices.  Pair-wise price correlations are all 
greater than 0.90 and average 0.96.  The extremely high price correlations are to be 
expected, given that advisory prices are all based on the same cash market price series. 
Correlation coefficients also are estimated for the difference between net advisory price 
and market benchmark prices.  Not surprisingly, correlations are lower for price 
differences.  Average correlations with respect to the cash, index and empirical 
benchmark are 0.30, 0.66 and 0.09, respectively.
16  While the level varies with each 
benchmark, the difference estimates suggest that dependence across advisory programs is 
likely to be a problem in testing the statistical significance of average price performance.  
This result is not unexpected because many of the programs appear to use similar 
methods of analysis, and all make heavy use of similar supply and demand information 
(e.g., USDA Hogs and Pigs Reports).  Hence, it appears to be inappropriate to assume 
  9that advisory program differences versus the benchmarks are independent across 
programs. 
 
The implication of incorrectly assuming independence of differences across 
programs is potentially severe.  The reliability of sample mean difference estimates is 
likely to be overstated, which will in turn bias t-tests towards a conclusion that pricing 
performance is significantly positive (assuming differences are positive on average).  A 
similar statistical problem occurs when testing the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) in 
the stock market because stock returns tend to be positively correlated across stocks.  
Fama and MacBeth develop a cross-sectional methodology to address this problem that 
has been applied in numerous studies of stock returns.  In the context of the present study, 
implementation of the Fama-MacBeth approach involves two steps.  The first step is to 
compute the average net advisory price across all programs active in a marketing quarter 
and then subtract the benchmark price from this “average” advisory price.  Call this 
difference   and repeat the computation for all 28 marketing quarters () .  
Since the underlying differences are assumed to be normally distributed and independent 
through time, the time-series of 28 b  will be normally distributed and independent.  As a 
result, the second step is to simply compute the usual t-statistic for the time-series of 28 
. 




The results of the average pricing test are found in Table 6.  Differences are 
presented for each of the 28-quarters, along with the statistics related to the Fama-
MacBeth test.
 17  The results show that average differences are quite small in nominal 
terms for all three benchmarks, -$0.41/cwt., $0.00/cwt. and -$0.27/cwt. versus the cash, 
index and empirical benchmarks, respectively.  Average differences can mask 
considerable variability across the benchmarks within a marketing quarter and across 
marketing quarters.  An example of this occurred in third quarter of 1998, where the 
average differences range from -$4.86/cwt. for the index benchmark to +$1.83/cwt. for 
the cash benchmark.  Two-tail p-values indicate none of the average differences are 
significantly different from zero at the five percent or lower level of significance, 
although the average difference versus the empirical benchmark just misses this cutoff.  
Overall, the test results show that advisory programs as a group do not outperform the 
market benchmarks in terms of average price.   
 
Further insight into the average pricing results can be found in Figure 3.  Each 
panel plots the time-series of the average difference between advisory programs and a 
given benchmark (left axis) versus the benchmark price level (right axis).  As shown in 
Panel A of Figure 3, when cash benchmark prices are low there is a tendency for the 
average difference between advisory programs and the cash benchmark to be positive, 
and vice versa.  This reflects positive hedging returns for the advisors when prices are 
low and negative hedging returns when prices are high.  Panel B indicates a completely 
different pattern for the index market benchmark.  The volatility of the index benchmark 
is substantially lower than the cash benchmark due to the relatively large amount of 
hedging (75% cumulatively) assumed for index benchmark.  For the same reason, 
average differences versus the index benchmark positively track the level of index 
  10benchmark prices.  In other words, the pattern of hedging profits and losses is roughly the 
same for advisory programs and the index benchmark.  As shown in Panel C, the pattern 
for differences from the empirical benchmark and the level of the empirical benchmark 
price falls somewhere between that of the cash and index benchmarks.  The empirical 
benchmark is slightly less volatile than the cash benchmark due to the modest amount of 
hedging assumed for the empirical benchmark.  However, the empirical benchmark is 
more volatile than the index benchmark because the index benchmark assumes a 
substantially higher level of hedging.  While the relationship between average differences 
and the empirical benchmark are attenuated relative to the cash benchmark, there 
nonetheless still appears to be a negative relationship between average differences and 
the empirical benchmark price.  Finally, correlations between the average differences and 
the benchmarks quantify the patterns just discussed.  The correlations are -0.78, +0.48 
and -0.42 versus the cash, index and empirical market benchmarks prices, respectively. 
 
Average Price and Risk Performance 
 
As noted in the previous section, average price comparisons may not provide a 
complete picture of performance.  For example, two advisory programs can generate the 
same average advisory price, but the risk of the programs may differ substantially.  The 
difference in risk may be the result of using different pricing tools (cash, forward, futures 
or options), different timing of sales and variation in the implementation of marketing 
strategies. 
 
A number of theoretical frameworks have been developed to analyze decision-
making under risk.  The mean-variance (EV) model is relatively simple and has been 
widely-applied in the marketing and risk management literature (Tomek and Peterson).  
To apply the single-period EV model to a particular decision, either distributions of 
outcomes must be normal or decision-makers must have quadratic utility functions 
(Hardaker, Huirne and Anderson).  If either or both of these conditions hold, then risky 
choices can be divided into efficient and inefficient sets based on the famous EV 
efficiency rule: if the mean of choice A is greater than or equal to the mean of choice B, 
and the variance of A is less than or equal to the variance of B, with at least one strict 
inequality holding, then A is preferred to B by all risk-averse decision makers.  Since 
quadratic utility has the unlikely characteristic that absolute risk aversion increases with 
the level of the outcome, application of the EV model usually is based upon an 
assumption of normally distributed outcomes.  This presents a potential problem in the 
case of market advisory programs that employ options strategies.  Such strategies are 
designed to create non-normal price distributions by truncating undesirable prices, either 
on the downside or the upside, or both.  Simulation analysis suggests that the EV model 
produces reasonably accurate results even in cases where options strategies are employed 
(Hanson and Ladd; Ladd and Hanson; Garcia, Adam and Hauser). 
 
The basic data needed for assessing market advisory pricing performance in an 
EV framework are presented in Table 4.  For each advisory program tracked in all 28 
marketing quarters, the average net advisory price and standard deviation of net advisory 
price are reported.
18  The average price and standard deviation of the three benchmarks 
  11also are reported.  The sample of advisory programs for the EV analysis is limited to 
those tracked in all 28 marketing quarters in order to maximize the number of 
observations available to estimate risk (standard deviation).
19  Average price varies 
relatively little across the 9 programs, with a low of $41.73/cwt. and a high of 
$43.77/cwt.  The standard deviation estimates suggest that the risk of advisory programs 
varies more widely, with a low of $7.24/cwt. and a high of $9.61/cwt.  The average 
standard deviation for the 9 programs, $8.34/cwt., is near the middle of the standard 
deviations for the three market benchmarks.  
 
Just as in the previous section, it is important to consider the level of aggregation 
for the EV analysis.  One possibility is to examine the mean and standard deviation of the 
“average” advisory program constructed for the average price tests.  Unfortunately, this is 
not a useful concept because the risk of the average program will be smaller than that 
typically experienced by subscribers to individual advisory programs (due to 
diversification effects).  An alternative is to consider a single “randomly-selected” 
advisory program (e.g., Elton, Gruber and Rentzler).  Such a program reflects both the 
average price and average risk of individual advisory programs.  Estimates for a single 
randomly-selected program can be found in Table 7 along the row labeled “Average.”  
While this is a useful way to summarize mean-standard deviation results for advisory 
programs, the difficulty is that an actual time-series of net prices for a randomly-selected 
program cannot be constructed.  This makes it difficult to conduct joint statistical tests for 
mean-standard deviation dominance.
20  The analysis here will focus on individual 
programs so that appropriate statistical tests can be conducted.  The tradeoff is that 
aggregation of individual program test results may be problematic due to the positive 
correlation of net prices across advisory programs.  This should be kept in mind when 
considering summary measures of the number of programs that dominate a particular 
benchmark. 
 
Mean-standard deviation dominance results for individual programs entail 
straightforward application of the EV efficiency rule discussed above.  Testing the 
statistical significance of the dominance results is less straightforward.  Fortunately, 
Bradley and Blackwood develop a simultaneous test of the equivalence of means and 
variances for paired data.  The initial step in the development of the test is to define the 
differences and sums for a given advisory program and benchmark as   
and  .  The first variable simply changes the notation used in equation (1).  
Next, specify the following regression relationship between the differences and sums,  
tt DN A P B P =− t
t
t e
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Now assume that net advisory and benchmark prices have a bi-variate normal distribution 
with a correlation coefficient between -1 and +1.  Under this assumption, Bradley and 
Blackwood show that, 
 
(4)  () ( ) ()
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where  i µ  is the mean price for the advisory program,  BP µ  is the mean price for the 
benchmark, 
2
i σ  is the variance of the advisory program, 
2
BP σ  is the variance of the 
benchmark and 
2
S σ  is the variance of the sum of advisor and benchmark prices.  Note that 




B P σ σ =  if and only if  12 0 β β = = .  As a result, the simultaneous test of 
the equivalence of means and variances (standard deviations) can be implemented in two 
steps.  First, run a regression of the relevant differences on the sums.  Second, calculate 
the F-statistic for the joint null hypothesis that the intercept ( ) 1 β and slope parameters 
() 2 β equal zero and compare the test statistic to critical F-values.
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Mean-standard deviation dominance results for the nine market advisory 
programs over 1995:I-2001:IV also are presented in Table 7.  Following the notational 
scheme suggested by Hardaker, Huirne and Anderson (p.143), a "+" indicates the average 
price for an advisory program is higher than the given benchmark and the standard 
deviation for the program is lower than the given benchmark.  In this case, the advisory 
program exhibits mean-standard deviation dominance of the given benchmark.  A "?" 
indicates the average price for an advisory program is higher (lower) than the given 
benchmark and the standard deviation for the program is higher (lower) than the given 
benchmark.  In this case, the advisory program does not exhibit mean-standard deviation 
dominance of the given benchmark, and vice versa.  A "-" indicates the average price for 
an advisory program is lower than the given benchmark and the standard deviation for the 
program is higher than the given benchmark.  In this case, the given benchmark exhibits 
mean-standard deviation dominance of the advisory program.  Based on the F-statistic 
from the Bradley-Blackwood regression, two stars indicate statistically significant 
dominance at the one percent level and one star indicates statistically significant 
dominance at the five percent level. 
 
The dominance results in Table 7 provide evidence of both positive and negative 
performance.  Three of the nine programs (33%) dominate the cash market benchmark, 
while the cash benchmark dominates two of the programs (22%).  In each of these five 
cases the dominance is statistically significant.  No program (0%) dominates the index 
market benchmark, while the index benchmark dominates four programs (44%).  In two 
of these latter four cases the dominance is statistically significant.  The results for the 
empirical benchmark are similar to those for the cash benchmark, with three programs 
dominating the empirical benchmark (33%) and the empirical benchmark dominating two 
programs (22%).  Only one of the three cases of positive dominance by the programs is 
statistically significant.   
 
Overall, the test results in this section suggest that advisory programs as a group 
do not outperform the market benchmarks in terms of average price and risk.  There are a 
total of six cases in the comparisons where advisory programs dominate a benchmark, but 
these are more than offset by the eight cases where a benchmark dominates a program.  
The most evidence of positive performance is found for the cash and empirical 
  13benchmarks and the least for the index benchmarks.  The reason for this result can be 
seen in Figure 4, where the average price and risk for individual advisory programs and 
the market benchmarks are plotted.  The graphs show that the average price and risk for 
the cash and empirical benchmarks are quite similar, which, as noted in the previous 
section, is not a surprise given the relatively small amount of hedging associated with the 
empirical benchmark.  In contrast, the risk of the index benchmark is substantially 
smaller than either of the other two benchmarks or any of the nine advisory programs due 
to the relatively large amount of hedging assumed for the index benchmark (75% 
cumulatively).  The substantially smaller risk of the index benchmark is consistent with 
the evidence from previous studies on hedging with live/lean hog futures.  These studies 




A key motivation for the EV analysis is to determine whether consideration of 
risk alters performance conclusions based only on average price.  This is best seen by 
comparing the proportion of advisory programs that beat the benchmarks in terms of 
average price only with the proportion of programs that dominate the benchmarks in 
terms of average price and risk.  In the case of the cash market benchmark, advisory 
programs beat the benchmark 41% of the time based on price alone (Table 5).  The 
proportion drops to 33% when risk is considered.  Examining the index market 
benchmark, programs outperform the benchmark 56% of the time based on average price 
alone, but drop to 0% when risk is considered.  When comparisons are made against the 
empirical benchmark, programs outperform the benchmark 46% of the time based on 
average price alone, but again drop to 33% when risk is considered.  One is left with the 
clear result that consideration of risk tends to weaken evidence regarding the pricing 




Even if, as a group, advisory programs do not outperform market benchmarks, 
there is a wide range in performance for any given quarter.  The average variation across 
advisory programs within a quarter is substantial, at approximately $6.00/cwt.  This 
raises the question of the predictability of advisory program performance from quarter-to-
quarter.  The predictability test used in this study is the correlation of advisory program 
ranks across marketing quarters and years.  This testing procedure has been widely used 
in studies of financial investment performance (e.g., Elton, Gruber and Rentzler) and in 
earlier studies of market advisory performance (e.g. Irwin, Martines-Filho and Good).
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The first step in this testing procedure is to form the sample of all advisory 
programs that are active in adjacent quarters.  The second step is to rank each advisory 
program in the first quarter of the pair (e.g., t = 1995:I) based on net advisory price.  Then 
the programs are sorted in descending rank order.  The third step is to sort and rank the 
same sample of programs in the second quarter of the pair (e.g., t + 1 = 1995:II).  The 
fourth step is to compute the correlation coefficient between the ranks for the two 
adjacent quarters.  If advisory program performance is unpredictable, the estimated 
  14correlation will be near zero.  Assuming the standard error of the correlation coefficient is 
approximately equal to1 , the appropriate statistical test is a Z-test.    T
 
Results of the rank correlation predictability test by quarter are presented in Table 
8.  Rank correlation coefficients ranged from –0.25 to +0.86.  Statistically significant 
rank correlations are found in only 5 of the 27 quarterly comparisons.  Note that the 
evidence of significant correlations should be viewed cautiously since the reported p-
values may overstate significance due to dependence across advisory programs.  The 
average rank correlation across all paired comparisons is 0.30, suggesting some 
predictability in the relative pricing performance market advisory programs in hogs.   
 
While the previous results indicate some evidence of performance predictability 
across marketing quarters, it may be of little use from an economic standpoint because 
marketing windows for adjacent quarters overlap by three quarters.  For example, a 
producer selecting an advisory program at the end of the first quarter in 1995 would only 
be able to fully implement their selection starting with the marketing window for the first 
quarter of 1996 (which starts at the beginning of 1995:II).  Hence, performance would 
have to persist across four marketing quarters for a producer to fully benefit from 
predictability. 
 
Results of the rank correlation predictability test for non-overlapping marketing 
quarters are presented in Table 9.  Rank correlation coefficients ranged from –0.69 to 
+0.43.  Only 2 of the 24 correlations are statistically significant and the two significant 
correlations are negative.  Furthermore, the average rank correlation across all paired 
non-overlapping comparisons is -0.01.  These results indicate predictability of pricing 
performance for advisory programs is short-lived, in the sense that performance does not 
persist long enough to benefit hog producers. 
 
The predictability results presented so far are all based on individual marketing 
quarter comparisons.  It is possible for performance to be predictable over longer time 
horizons, but unpredictable over short horizons due to a large amount of “noise” in 
performance from quarter-to-quarter (e.g., Summers).  To assess longer-term 
predictability, predictability is tested for an annual performance horizon.  The first step in 
this testing procedure is to form the sample of all advisory programs that are active in 
each marketing quarter for adjacent calendar years.  The second step is to average each 
program’s price across the four marketing quarters of the first year of each pair (e.g., t = 
1997) and rank each advisory program in the first year of the pair based on average net 
advisory price.  The third step is to average, sort and rank the same sample of programs 
in the second year of the pair (e.g., t + 1 = 1998).  The fourth step is to compute the 
correlation coefficient between the ranks for the two adjacent calendar years.  The results 
are striking, in that the average correlation, 0.05, is quite close to zero and none of the 
individual correlations are statistically significant.
 24  Hence, there is no evidence of 
longer-term predictability. 
 
Similar to the findings in earlier studies of market advisory performance in corn, 
soybeans and wheat (Irwin, Martines-Filho and Good; Jirik et al.), the test results 
  15presented in this section provide little evidence that the pricing performance of advisory 
programs in hogs can be usefully predicted from past performance.  However, as Irwin, 
Martines-Filho and Good point out, this conclusion does not mean it is impossible to 
predict advisory program performance.  There may be other variables that are useful for 
predicting performance.  Chevalier and Ellison study whether mutual fund performance is 
related to characteristics of fund managers that indicate ability, knowledge or effort, and 
find that managers who attended higher-SAT undergraduate institutions generate 
systematically higher returns.  Barber and Odean examine the trading records of 
individual stock investors and report that frequent trading substantially depresses 
investment returns.  Similar factors, such as education of advisors or frequency of futures 
and options trading may be useful in predicting the performance of market advisory 
programs in hogs. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
  
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the pricing performance of agricultural 
market advisory services for hogs.  The data for the study is provided by the Agricultural 
Market Advisory Service (AgMAS) Project.  Pricing recommendations are available for 
all quarters from the beginning of 1995 through the end of 2001.  Since the AgMAS 
Project subscribes to all of the services and collects "real-time" recommendations, the 
data is not subject to survivorship bias.  Based on these recommendations, the net price 
that would have been received by a hog producer who precisely follows the set of pricing 
recommendations is computed.  Since cash hog pricing recommendations are often 
limited and quite short-run in nature, the same cash marketing strategy is assumed for all 
services.  Therefore, the net advisory price is computed as the quarterly average cash sale 
price plus or minus gains/losses and brokerage costs associated with futures and options 
transactions. In addition, three market benchmarks are developed for the evaluations.  
 
Analysis of the advisory program marketing recommendations in hogs shows that 
the most frequently used marketing tool is a futures only position, with every program 
employing futures in at least one quarter.  On average, futures only positions are used in 
55.9% of the marketing quarters examined in this study.  It is also found that the average 
amount of pricing previous to a marketing quarter is relatively modest.  Across all 
programs, the average cumulative amount priced at the start of a marketing quarter is 
only 21.7%.  While the amount of pricing is relatively modest on average, there is large 
variation in the amount priced within marketing quarters, across marketing quarters and 
across advisory programs.  This indicates advisory programs in hogs frequently engage in 
what Working termed “selective” hedging strategies 
 
Three basic tests of performance are examined for quarterly advisory program 
prices over 1995:I-2001:IV.  The first test compares the average price of advisory 
programs to the market benchmarks.  The results show that average differences between 
advisory programs and market benchmarks are small in nominal terms for all three 
benchmarks, -$0.41/cwt., $0.00/cwt. and -$0.27/cwt. versus the cash, index and empirical 
benchmarks, respectively, and none of the average differences are significantly different 
  16from zero.  Hence, advisory programs as a group do not outperform the market 
benchmarks in terms of average price.   
 
The second test is the average price and risk of advisory programs relative to the 
market benchmarks.  Test results indicate that three of the nine programs dominate the 
cash market benchmark, no program dominates the index market benchmark and three 
programs dominate the empirical benchmark.  So, there is a total of six cases in the 
comparisons where advisory programs dominate a benchmark, but these are more than 
offset by the eight cases where a benchmark dominates a program.  Overall, the test 
results in this section suggest that advisory programs as a group do not outperform the 
market benchmarks in terms of average price and risk.   
 
The third test is the predictability of advisory program performance from period-
to-period.  The average rank correlation of advisory program pricing performance across 
adjacent market quarters is 0.30.  However, rank correlations are statistically significant 
in only 5 of the 27 comparisons.  Even this modest level of predictability may be of little 
use from an economic standpoint because marketing windows for adjacent quarters 
overlap.  More specifically, the average rank correlation across all paired non-
overlapping comparisons is only -0.01.  These results indicate that any predictability of 
pricing performance for advisory programs is short-lived, in the sense that performance 
does not persist long enough to benefit hog producers. 
 
In conclusion, the results provide a reasonably clear picture of the performance of 
market advisory programs in hogs.  There is little evidence that advisory programs as a 
group outperform market benchmarks, especially after considering risk.  This supports 
the view that hogs markets (cash, futures and options) are efficient with respect to the 
types of marketing strategies available to producers (e.g., Zulauf and Irwin).  Market 
advisory services (as a group) do not appear to have access to information not available 
to other hog market participants and/or superior analytical skills.  In addition, there is 
little evidence that advisory programs in hogs with superior performance can be usefully 
selected based on past performance.  
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Endnotes 
1 When the AgMAS study began in 1994, DTN and FarmDayta were separate companies.  The two 
companies merged in 1996. 
 
2 Of the advisory programs tracked by the AgMAS Project, a smaller number provide marketing 
recommendations for hogs as compared to grains.  For example, a total of 39 and 38 advisory service 
programs for corn and soybeans, respectively, have been included in the 1995-2001 sample at some point 
in time.  It appears that more advisory services focus on the grain markets than the livestock markets. 
 
3 The combination category includes quarters where futures and options positions are used simultaneously 
and where they are used separately in the same quarter. 
 
4 The definition of delta is the dollar amount that the value of a position changes for a one unit increase in 
the price of the underlying commodity. 
 
5 A detailed explanation of the construction of marketing profiles can be found in Webber.  
 
6 Quarterly average marketing profiles for individual market advisory programs are found in Webber. 
 
7 A similar type of behavior has been frequently observed in the risk management programs of financial 
and non-financial corporations, where it is labeled “hedging with a view” (Stulz; Brown and Khokher; 
Brown, Crabb and Haushalter). 
 
8 There are exceptions.  Baille and Myers present estimates of optimal hedge ratios for several commodities 
that allow for time-varying risk estimates.  Some of the plots of the estimated optimal hedge ratios indicate 
substantial time-series variation in optimal hedge ratios due to time-varying risk alone. 
 
9 A consistent live-weight cash price series is not available for the Iowa/Minnesota spot market for the 
entire 1995-2001 sample due to complications associated with the change to a mandatory price reporting 
system (Ward).  For a period in 2000, live-weight cash prices actually were not reported.   In order to create 
a consistent live-weight series, Iowa/Minnesota carcass prices are converted to a live-weight basis.  This 
carcass price series is available for the entire sample period and is computed as the quarterly average 
carcass price for barrows and gilts recorded each Wednesday during the marketing quarter.  These prices 
are obtained from the Kansas State University livestock marketing web page 
(http://www.agecon.ksu.edu/livestock).  Carcass prices are converted to a live-weight basis by multiplying 
each price by a conversion factor of 0.74.  We are indebted to James Mintert of Kansas State University for 
suggesting this procedure to obtain live-weight prices. 
 
10 Behavioral market theory suggests that the average return actually achieved by a significant number of 
market participants may be less than that predicted by efficient market theory, due to the judgment and 
decision biases that plague these participants (e.g., Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam).  As a result, 
the average return actually received by the relevant group of market participants also becomes an 
appropriate benchmark.  Based on this argument, Irwin, Martines-Filho and Good specify a behavioral 
benchmark that measures the average price actually received by farmers for corn and soybeans.  A 
comparable “farmer” benchmark is not specified in hogs due to the difficulty of specifying such a 
benchmark that is comparable to net advisory prices.  First, there are wide differences in pricing 
mechanisms and premiums/discounts for grade and quality across hog producers that are not likely fully 
reflected in the available USDA price received series for hogs.  Second, USDA average price received 
series are only available on a state average basis, whereas the cash price series used in this study is based 
on Iowa/Minnesota area prices.  In sum, unlike the situation in corn and soybeans, it is appears to be 
unreasonable to argue that the USDA price received series can be used as the basis for constructing a useful 
farmer benchmark in hogs. 
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11 Weaker versions of the theory of efficient markets predict advisory services may profit to the degree they 
have superior access to information and/or superior analytical ability (e.g., Zulauf and Irwin).  While 
logically appealing, it is quite difficult, if not impossible, to specify market benchmarks based on weaker 
versions of the theory because it requires knowledge of the average access to information and analytical 
ability of market participants. 
 
12 These averages do not necessarily equal the average of the individual quarter averages.  This “grand” 
average equally weights the net advisory prices in the sample, which implies an equal probability of 
randomly selecting an individual advisory program across the sample.  An average of the individual 
marketing quarter averages equally weights the marketing quarters.  This is a subtle, but potentially 
important, difference. 
 
13 When considering performance results, it is useful to note that hog producers subscribe to the market 
advisory programs for a variety of reasons.  In a national survey, Pennings et al. find that the two highest 
rated uses for market advisory programs by farmer-subscribers are market information and market analysis.  
Although it is likely that the quality of the marketing information and analysis is highly correlated with the 
returns to marketing recommendations, this may not be the case.  It is feasible for a program to provide 
helpful information and analysis to producer-subscribers, while failing to exhibit superior pricing 
performance.   
 
14 It should be stressed the tests presented in this section examine performance of market advisory programs 
as a group.  It is possible for the advisory programs, as a group, to fail to beat the market benchmarks, yet 
some programs may still show “exceptional” or “inferior” performance. Statistical tests are conducted for 
the nine programs tracked over the entire 1995:I-2001:IV sample.  Net prices for three advisory programs 
are significantly below the cash and empirical market benchmarks.  No program had net prices significantly 
above either the cash or empirical benchmark.  No individual program had net prices significantly above or 
below the index benchmark.  These results are available from the authors upon request. 
 
15 The normality test results are available from the authors upon request. 
 
16 The full set of correlation results is available from the authors upon request. 
 
17 Differences are calculated as advisory price minus benchmark price.  So, a positive difference indicates 
an advisory price above the benchmark price, and vice versa. 
 
18 Standard deviation is substituted for variance as an estimate of risk because it easier to understand.  
Performance results are the same whether standard deviation or variance is used to estimate risk (Hardaker, 
Huirne and Anderson, p.143), hence the use of the simpler measure.  
 
19 The restriction means that only advisory programs active all 28 marketing quarters are included in the 
average price and risk evaluation.  As a result, there is the potential for survivorship bias in the average 
price and risk comparisons to the benchmarks.  Survivorship bias in the average estimates appears to be 
non-existent, as the average price across the 9 programs is actually 5 cents less than the average price 
computed across all advisory programs active in the 1995-2001 sample period (Table 4).  It is difficult to 
assess the degree of survivorship bias in advisory program standard deviation estimates given the small 
number of observations available for the programs not included for the full sample.  However, the average 
price comparisons suggest this bias is likely to be quite small or negligible. 
 
20 It is possible to conduct separate mean and standard deviation tests for a randomly-selected program and 
then combine the results based on a bounds condition (Collender).  However, such procedures ignore the 
paired nature of advisory program and benchmark data, which would lead to tests with little or no power to 
reject the null hypothesis (Snedecor and Cochrane, p. 101). 
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21 Jarque-Bera tests indicate that normality of net advisory prices is rejected for three advisory programs for 
differences versus the cash benchmark and none for differences versus the index or empirical benchmarks.  
Like the t-test, the F-test can be justified as a conservative and reliable approximation in cases where 
normality is rejected (Greene, p. 108). 
 
22 The results also are interesting to consider in light of previous evidence regarding risk premiums in 
live/lean hog futures prices.   For example, McKenzie and Holt find that live hog futures prices typically 
increase about two percent over a two-month horizon (“normal backwardation”).   The lower average 
prices for the empirical and index benchmarks are consistent with the existence of positive risk premiums 
that are a cost to short hedgers. 
 
23 Irwin, Martines-Filho and Good also use winner/loser contingency table tests and high-low quantile tests 
of predictability.  Both of these tests require that the sample of available programs be subdivided into 
different categories.  Doing so in the present case would create categories with as few as three programs.  
This may result in quite inaccurate estimates of performance for the different categories, and therefore, 
such tests are not attempted for hogs. 
 
24 In order to maximize the number of years available for testing, this analysis is based on overlapping 
marketing windows.  Similar results are found for tests based upon non-overlapping years.  These results 
are available from the authors upon request.   First Marketing Last Marketing
Market Advisory Program  Quarter Evaluated  Quarter Evaluated Comment
Ag Profit by Hjort 1995:I 2000:IV Went out of business at the end of August 2000. 
Ag Review 1995:I 2001:IV Included for all marketing quarters to date.
AgLine by Doane 1995:I 2001:IV Included for all marketing quarters to date.
AgResource 1995:I 2001:IV Included for all marketing quarters to date.
AgriVisor (aggressive hedge) 1995:I 2001:IV Included for all marketing quarters to date.
AgriVisor (basic hedge) 1995:I 2001:IV Included for all marketing quarters to date.
Brock 1995:I 2001:IV Included for all marketing quarters to date.
Grain Field Report 1995:I 1995:IV Stopped providing specific recommendations and dropped after 1995. 
North American Ag 1995:I 1995:IV Stopped providing specific recommendations and dropped after 1995. 
Pro Farmer 1995:I 2001:IV Included for all marketing quarters to date.
Progressive Ag 1996:I 2001:IV Established service first tracked for the 1996 crop year.
Prosperous Farmer 1995:I 1995:IV Stopped providing specific recommendations and dropped after 1995. 
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 1995:I 2001:IV Included for all marketing quarters to date.
Top Farmer Intelligence  1995:I 2001:IV Included for all marketing quarters to date.
Utterback Marketing Services 1997:I 2001:IV Previous to 1997, did not make clear enough recommendations to be tracked. 
Table 1.  Market Advisory Programs Tracked by the AgMAS Project in Hogs, 1995:I - 2001:IV Marketing Quarters
 25Combination 
Futures Options of Futures No Futures  
Market Advisory Program  Only  Only and Options or Options Total
Panel A: Number of Quarters
Ag Profit by Hjort 21 0 0 3 24
Ag Review 23 0 4 1 28
AgLine by Doane 19 4 0 5 28
AgResource 2 10 8 8 28
AgriVisor (aggressive hedge) 15 0 9 4 28
AgriVisor (basic hedge) 19 0 5 4 28
Brock 23 1 4 0 28
Pro Farmer 19 1 2 6 28
Progressive Ag 3 0 11 10 24
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 11 3 14 0 28
Top Farmer Intelligence 22 1 5 0 28
Utterback Marketing Services 2 2 14 2 20
  Average 15 2 6 4 27
Panel B: Percentage of Quarters
Ag Profit by Hjort 87.5 0.0 0.0 12.5 100
Ag Review 82.1 0.0 14.3 3.6 100
AgLine by Doane 67.9 14.3 0.0 17.9 100
AgResource 7.1 35.7 28.6 28.6 100
AgriVisor (aggressive hedge) 53.6 0.0 32.1 14.3 100
AgriVisor (basic hedge) 67.9 0.0 17.9 14.3 100
Brock 82.1 3.6 14.3 0.0 100
Pro Farmer 67.9 3.6 7.1 21.4 100
Progressive Ag 12.5 0.0 45.8 41.7 100
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 39.3 10.7 50.0 0.0 100
Top Farmer Intelligence 78.6 3.6 17.9 0.0 100
Utterback Marketing Services 10.0 10.0 70.0 10.0 100
  Average 55.9 6.9 23.8 13.4 100
Note: Advisory programs with one year or less of data are excluded to minimize the impact of programs that have only
few positions.  
--- # ---
---%---
Table 2.  Frequency of Marketing Tool Use by Individual Market Advisory Programs in Hogs, 
1995:I - 2001:IV Marketing Quarters
Marketing Tool
 26Market Advisory Program 9-months 6-months 3-months 0-months
Panel A: Average Net Amount Priced
Ag Profit by Hjort 6.2 12.5 18.1 22.6
Ag Review 0.0 0.0 4.4 19.3
AgLine by Doane 4.5 11.9 22.3 31.6
AgResource 0.0 1.2 8.1 14.7
AgriVisor (aggressive hedge) 6.4 10.7 14.7 21.5
AgriVisor (basic hedge) 4.9 8.1 11.1 17.6
Brock 3.6 13.4 27.0 31.1
Pro Farmer 0.9 5.4 14.3 19.7
Progressive Ag 6.6 7.4 15.0 13.8
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 1.2 8.1 10.4 20.7
Top Farmer Intelligence 1.2 10.5 18.0 17.3
Utterback Marketing Services 0.0 2.2 17.2 30.5
     All Programs 3.0 7.6 15.0 21.7
Panel B. Minimum Net Amount Priced
Ag Profit by Hjort 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Ag Review 0.0 0.0 -50.0 0.0
AgLine by Doane 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
AgResource 0.0 0.0 -17.1 -41.4
AgriVisor (aggressive hedge) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
AgriVisor (basic hedge) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Brock 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Pro Farmer 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Progressive Ag 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 0.0 0.0 0.0 -100.0
Top Farmer Intelligence 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Utterback Marketing Services 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
     All Programs 0.0 0.0 -50.0 -100.0
Panel C: Maximum Net Amount Priced
Ag Profit by Hjort 50.0 51.6 78.3 63.3
Ag Review 0.0 0.0 50.0 81.2
AgLine by Doane 50.0 50.0 75.0 100.0
AgResource 0.0 25.3 66.7 83.3
AgriVisor (aggressive hedge) 66.0 66.0 66.0 110.0
AgriVisor (basic hedge) 50.0 50.0 50.0 100.0
Brock 50.0 50.0 85.1 75.0
Pro Farmer 25.0 50.0 75.0 89.0
Progressive Ag 75.0 75.0 100.6 102.1
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 33.3 100.0 100.0 100.0
Top Farmer Intelligence 33.3 100.0 100.0 101.6
Utterback Marketing Services 0.0 40.0 64.4 100.0
     All Programs 75.0 100.0 100.6 110.0
Table 3.  Descriptive Statistics for Net Amount Priced by Market 
Advisory Programs for Hogs, Selected Dates, 1995:I - 2001:IV Marketing 
Quarters
Net Amount Priced Prior to Start of Marketing Quarter
---%---
Note: Advisory programs with one year or less of data are excluded to minimize the impact of programs that have only 
a few positions. The 0-month statistics are based on the day prior to the beginning of the marketing quarter.
 27Number of 
Quarter Programs Average Minimum Maximum Range Cash  Index Empirical
1995:I 13 38.08 36.25 39.07 2.82 38.73 38.70 38.72
1995:II 13 39.09 35.98 41.02 5.04 39.41 39.20 39.34
1995:III 13 47.05 44.79 49.59 4.81 49.01 46.56 48.34
1995:IV 13 41.84 39.11 43.32 4.21 43.42 40.49 42.64
1996:I 11 45.82 42.73 47.37 4.63 46.36 44.99 46.01
1996:II 11 51.42 47.42 54.53 7.11 54.76 47.92 52.56
1996:III 11 54.73 49.52 57.04 7.52 58.01 52.28 56.45
1996:IV 11 53.58 47.26 55.78 8.52 54.91 51.63 54.21
1997:I 12 51.80 49.56 54.06 4.50 51.50 51.19 51.42
1997:II 12 56.15 54.27 59.02 4.75 56.44 52.96 55.32
1997:III 12 54.51 52.70 56.05 3.35 55.05 52.51 54.36
1997:IV 12 43.66 41.47 46.20 4.73 44.35 47.89 45.30
1998:I 12 36.19 34.19 39.87 5.68 34.79 40.28 36.20
1998:II 12 40.16 38.11 43.37 5.26 39.38 41.21 39.97
1998:III 12 35.73 32.88 42.49 9.60 33.89 40.59 35.71
1998:IV 12 24.13 19.51 28.24 8.73 20.34 30.02 22.94
1999:I 12 27.11 19.88 30.41 10.53 26.10 29.22 26.90
1999:II 12 34.45 31.97 38.40 6.43 33.85 33.35 33.69
1999:III 12 36.45 31.74 41.29 9.55 35.46 41.32 37.05
1999:IV 12 35.70 31.15 38.26 7.12 36.37 36.21 36.33
2000:I 12 38.50 36.14 40.85 4.71 40.31 37.20 39.51
2000:II 12 47.70 43.71 51.06 7.35 49.97 44.56 48.23
2000:III 12 46.22 43.89 48.02 4.14 45.78 47.04 46.12
2000:IV 12 40.09 38.18 41.03 2.85 39.87 39.89 39.88
2001:I 11 41.64 38.67 43.09 4.43 41.92 38.75 41.10
2001:II 11 49.99 45.97 52.43 6.46 51.94 47.36 50.47
2001:III 11 48.93 44.25 51.27 7.02 50.94 46.33 49.69
2001:IV 11 38.25 36.67 42.08 5.41 37.62 39.20 38.04
  Average 42.82 39.57 45.54 5.97 43.23 42.82 43.09
Note: The cash benchmark price is the Iowa/Minnesota quarterly average price.  The index benchmark price consists of 
the cash benchmark price plus gains/losses associated with pricing 75% of production over the 9-month period prior to 
the marketing quarter.  Hedges are lifted once a month during the marketing quarter.  The empirical benchmark price is 
similar to the index benchmark price, except a substantially lower amount of production is priced prior to the marketing 
quarter.  This reflects the actual pricing behavior of market advisory programs during the sample period.
Table 4.  Descriptive Statistics for Market Advisory Program Pricing Results in 
Hogs, 1995:I - 2001:IV Marketing Quarters
Net Advisory Price Market Benchmark Price
---$/cwt.--- ---$/cwt.---
 28Number of
Marketing Quarter Programs Cash Index Empirical
1995:I 13 23 54 38
1995:II 13 38 62 46
1995:III 13 8 46 23
1995:IV 13 0 92 31
1996:I 11 18 91 36
1996:II 11 0 91 45
1996:III 11 0 73 36
1996:IV 11 27 91 64
1997:I 12 67 83 75
1997:II 12 42 100 75
1997:III 12 33 100 58
1997:IV 12 25 0 17
1998:I 12 83 0 33
1998:II 12 92 17 33
1998:III 12 67 8 33
1998:IV 12 92 0 67
1999:I 12 75 33 50
1999:II 12 50 83 58
1999:III 12 50 0 33
1999:IV 12 42 42 42
2000:I 12 25 75 33
2000:II 12 17 75 50
2000:III 12 50 33 50
2000:IV 12 50 50 50
2001:I 11 64 91 82
2001:II 11 18 82 55
2001:III 11 27 73 45
2001:IV 11 64 27 36
  Average 41 56 46
Table 5.  Proportion of Advisory Programs above Market Benchmarks in Hogs, 
1995:I - 2001:IV Marketing Quarters
Proportion of Programs Above Benchmark
--- % ---
Note: Average proportions for 1995 - 2001 are computed over a full data set of advisory programs.  
As a result, averages of individual quarter proportions may not equal the average proportions 
reported for 1995 - 2001.  The cash benchmark price is the Iowa/Minnesota quarterly average price. 
The index benchmark price consists of the cash benchmark price plus gains/losses associated with 
pricing 75% of production over the 9-month period prior to the marketing quarter.  Hedges are lifted 
once a month during the marketing quarter.  The empirical benchmark price is similar to the index 
benchmark price, except a substantially lower amount of production is priced prior to the marketing 
quarter.  This reflects the actual pricing behavior of market advisory programs during the sample 
period.
 29Marketing Quarter Cash Index Empirical
1995:I -0.66 -0.63 -0.65
1995:II -0.32 -0.12 -0.26
1995:III -1.96 0.49 -1.29
1995:IV -1.58 1.35 -0.79
1996:I -0.54 0.83 -0.19
1996:II -3.34 3.50 -1.14
1996:III -3.28 2.45 -1.72
1996:IV -1.33 1.95 -0.63
1997:I 0.30 0.61 0.38
1997:II -0.30 3.19 0.83
1997:III -0.54 2.00 0.15
1997:IV -0.69 -4.23 -1.64
1998:I 1.40 -4.09 -0.01
1998:II 0.78 -1.05 0.19
1998:III 1.83 -4.86 0.02
1998:IV 3.79 -5.88 1.20
1999:I 1.01 -2.12 0.20
1999:II 0.61 1.10 0.76
1999:III 0.99 -4.87 -0.60
1999:IV -0.67 -0.51 -0.63
2000:I -1.81 1.30 -1.01
2000:II -2.28 3.14 -0.53
2000:III 0.44 -0.82 0.10
2000:IV 0.22 0.20 0.22
2001:I -0.27 2.89 0.54
2001:II -1.95 2.63 -0.47
2001:III -2.01 2.60 -0.75
2001:IV 0.63 -0.94 0.21
  Average Difference -0.41 0.00 -0.27
  Standard Deviation 1.58 2.71 0.73
  t-statistic -1.38 0.01 -1.96
  Two-tail p-value 0.18 0.99 0.06
Note: The cash benchmark price is the Iowa/Minnesota quarterly average price.  The index 
benchmark price consists of the cash benchmark price plus gains/losses associated with pricing
75% of production over the 9-month period prior to the marketing quarter.  Hedges are lifted 
once a month during the marketing quarter.  The empirical benchmark price is similar to the 
index benchmark price, except a substantially lower amount of production is priced prior to 
the marketing quarter.  This reflects the actual pricing behavior of market advisory programs 
during the sample period. Two stars indicates significance at the one percent level and one star 
indicates significance at the five percent level.
Table 6.  Average Pricing Performance Results for Market 
Advisory Programs in Hogs, 1995:I - 2001:IV Marketing Quarters
 Market Benchmarks
---$ per cwt.---
Difference Between Average Advisory Program and
 30Standard
Market Advisory Program Average  Deviation Cash Index Empirical
Ag Review 42.37 9.61 - - -
AgLine by Doane 42.35 7.24 ? - ?
AgResource 43.43 8.57 + ? ?
AgriVisor (aggressive hedge) 43.00 8.29 ? ? ?
AgriVisor (basic hedge) 43.12 8.37 ? ? +
Brock 41.96 8.20 ? - ?
Pro Farmer 43.24 7.38 + ? +
Stewart-Peterson Advisory Reports 41.73 9.44 - - -
Top Farmer Intelligence 43.77 7.99 + ? +
Average 42.77 8.34
Benchmark
  Cash 43.23 9.38 3 0 3
  Index 42.82 6.56 4 5 4
  Empirical 43.09 8.49 2 4 2
Dominance versus Benchmark
Table 7.  Average, Standard Deviation and Mean-Variance Dominance Results for Nine 
Market Advisory Programs in Hogs, 1995:I - 2001:IV Marketing Quarters
Total Count
In this case, the advisory program exhibits mean-standard deviation dominance of the given benchmark.  A "?" indicates the 
average price for an advisory program is higher (lower) than the given benchmark and the standard deviation for the program is 
higher (lower) than the given benchmark.  In this case, the advisory program does not exhibit mean-standard deviation 
dominance of the given benchmark, and vice versa.  A "-" indicates the average price for an advisory program is lower than the 
given benchmark and the standard deviation for the program is higher than the given benchmark.  In this case, the given 
benchmark exhibits mean-standard deviation dominance of the advisory program. Two stars indicates statistically significant 
dominance at the one percent level and one star indicates significant dominance at the five percent level.
---$/cwt.---
Note:  The cash benchmark price is the Iowa/Minnesota quarterly average price.  The index benchmark price consists of the cash
benchmark price plus gains/losses associated with pricing 75% of production over the 9-month period prior to the marketing 
quarter.  Hedges are lifted once a month during the marketing quarter.  The empirical benchmark price is similar to the index 
benchmark price, except a substantially lower amount of production is priced prior to the marketing quarter.  This reflects the 
actual pricing behavior of market advisory programs during the sample period. A "+" indicates the average price for an advisory 











 31Quarter Quarter Number of  Correlation Two-tail
t t+1 Observations  Coefficient Z-statistic  p-value
1995:I 1995:II 12 0.40 1.45 0.15
1995:II 1995:III 12 0.26 0.93 0.35
1995:III 1995:IV 12 0.63 2.26 0.02
1995:IV 1996:I 9 0.58 1.82 1.82
1996:I 1996:II 10 -0.25 -0.81 0.42
1996:II 1996:III 10 0.55 1.84 0.07
1996:III 1996:IV 10 0.52 1.72 0.09
1996:IV 1997:I 10 0.06 0.21 0.83
1997:I 1997:II 11 0.06 0.22 0.83
1997:II 1997:III 11 0.33 1.14 0.25
1997:III 1997:IV 11 0.86 2.98 0.00
1997:IV 1998:I 11 0.04 0.15 0.88
1998:I 1998:II 11 0.08 0.27 0.79
1998:II 1998:III 11 0.49 1.70 0.09
1998:III 1998:IV 11 0.47 1.62 0.10
1998:IV 1999:I 11 0.41 1.43 0.15
1999:I 1999:II 11 0.29 1.02 0.31
1999:II 1999:III 11 0.51 1.77 0.08
1999:III 1999:IV 11 -0.30 -1.04 0.30
1999:IV 2000:I 11 0.04 0.15 0.88
2000:I 2000:II 11 0.57 1.99 0.05
2000:II 2000:III 11 -0.41 -1.43 0.15
2000:III 2000:IV 11 0.32 1.11 0.27
2000:IV 2001:I 10 0.79 2.62 0.01
2001:I 2001:II 10 0.07 0.24 0.81
2001:II 2001:III 10 0.64 2.11 0.03
2001:III 2001:IV 10 0.08 0.27 0.79
0.30 Average
Table 8.  Predictability of Market Advisory Program Performance by Rank 
Between Adjacent Pairs of Marketing Quarters in Hogs, 1995:I - 2001:IV 
Marketing Quarters







 32Quarter Quarter Number of  Correlation Two-tail
t t+1 Observations  Coefficient Z-statistic  p-value
1995:I 1996:I 9 0.25 0.79 0.43
1995:II 1996:II 9 -0.03 -0.10 0.92
1995:III 1996:III 9 0.33 1.05 0.29
1995:IV 1996:IV 9 0.09 0.29 0.77
1996:I 1997:I 11 -0.16 -0.54 0.59
1996:II 1997:II 11 0.32 1.06 0.29
1996:III 1997:III 11 -0.01 -0.03 0.98
1996:IV 1997:IV 11 -0.25 -0.84 0.40
1997:I 1998:I 12 -0.69 -2.37 0.02
1997:II 1998:II 12 0.27 0.92 0.36
1997:III 1998:III 12 0.38 1.31 0.19
1997:IV 1998:IV 12 0.35 1.21 0.23
1998:I 1999:I 12 -0.13 -0.44 0.66
1998:II 1999:II 12 -0.16 -0.56 0.58
1998:III 1999:III 12 0.16 0.56 0.58
1998:IV 1999:IV 12 -0.20 -0.68 0.50
1999:I 2000:I 12 -0.57 -1.99 0.05
1999:II 2000:II 12 -0.09 -0.31 0.75
1999:III 2000:III 12 -0.48 -1.67 0.09
1999:IV 2000:IV 12 -0.22 -0.75 0.45
2000:I 2001:I 11 0.11 0.36 0.72
2000:II 2001:II 11 -0.09 -0.30 0.76
2000:III 2001:III 11 0.43 1.42 0.16
2000:IV 2001:IV 11 0.08 0.27 0.79
-0.01 Average
Table 9.  Predictability of Market Advisory Program Performance by Rank 
Between Adjacent Pairs of Non-Overlapping Marketing Quarters in Hogs, 1995:I - 
2001:IV Marketing Quarters




 33Year Year Number of  Correlation Two-tail
t t+1 Observations  Coefficient Z-statistic  p-value
1995 1996 10 -0.01 -0.02 0.98
1996 1997 9 -0.24 -0.78 0.43
1997 1998 11 -0.20 -0.68 0.50
1998 1999 11 0.48 1.65 0.10
1999 2000 11 -0.20 -0.68 0.50
2000 2001 10 0.46 1.54 0.12
0.05 Average
Table 10.  Predictability of Market Advisory Program Performance by Rank 
Between Adjacent Pairs of Marketing Years in Hogs, 1995 - 2001 Marketing Years
Note: Two stars indicates significance at the one percent level and one star indicates significance at the fiv
percent level.
 34Panel A: Conservative Approach, 1999:III
Panel B: Aggressive Approach, 1999:I

























































First Day of Marketing Quarter
 35Figure 2.  Marketing Profiles for Hogs, All Programs Combined, 1995:I - 2001:IV Marketing Quarters
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 36Figure 3.  Average Difference Between Advisory Programs and 
Market Benchmark Prices for Hogs, 1995:I - 2001:IV 
Marketing Quarters














































































































































































 37Figure 4.  Average Net Advisory Price and Standard Deviation 
for Nine Advisory Programs versus Market Benchmarks for 
Hogs, 1995:I - 2001:IV Marketing Quarters
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